Hermans, Claire, Laura Kijm, Marieke Paardekooper, Jens C. Koblitz, Peter Stilz, Anne-Jifke Haarsma, Marcel E. Visser, and Kamiel Spoelstra. "Limited immediate effect of artificial light of realistic intensity on flight behaviour of commuting pond bat (Myotis dasycneme)." Basic and Applied Ecology (2025).

 What They Did

The researchers studied the effects of artificial light on the movements of pond bats traveling from their roosting areas to their foraging areas. Because these bats forage over lakes and ponds and use linear bodies of water such as rivers to navigate, the researchers placed temporary lampposts with computer-controlled LEDs at the centers of bridges over streams known to be followed by the bats.

The light colors varied between red, amber, yellowish white, and bluish white, and each color was tested at two different intensities. A multi-directional microphone was used to record the bat echolocation sounds, allowing their flight paths to be reconstructed. Data was collected from five bridges for two nights per bridge, once with lower intensity light and once with higher intensity. For each night, the four light colors plus the no-light control were activated in random order; this process was repeated three times, and the researchers ensured that each repetition on a given night had a different order. The light was positioned to reflect on the water in the direction the bats were flying from; they had to fly towards the light to reach their foraging area.

The researchers found no effect of light on flight speed. The only significant effect was that the bats had straighter flight paths when exposed to the bluish white light. The researchers suggest that the light used was not intense enough to disturb the bats, since they had witnessed bats turning away from much more intense light in a previous study.

Further Exploration

The effect of light pollution on nocturnal animals is a concern for conservation. (For lots of information, see https://myfwc.com/conservation/you-conserve/lighting/pollution). Diurnal animals can be attracted to the light, making them more vulnerable to predators. Nocturnal animals might avoid lit areas, meaning they lose habitat even if the area isn’t otherwise altered. Long wavelengths such as red and amber are less of a problem to nocturnal animals because their rod-based visual system doesn’t perceive them as strongly, and path lighting that’s near the ground causes less disruption to wildlife than tall streetlights.

Sometimes simply reducing the light makes a difference: animals from nesting shorebirds to endangered fireflies have returned to abandoned habitat when companies and municipalities have agreed to dim recently installed lights (see https://www.nwf.org/Home/Magazines/National-Wildlife/2023/Summer/Conservation/Light-Pollution-Wildlife). We also may not need as much light for safety as we think we do. Several studies have shown no effect from street lighting on either crime or accidents, and glare from bright lights can make it harder for our eyes to adjust. Instead of seeing the whole area in dim light, we don’t see anything at all in shadowed areas. (see https://darksky.org/resources/what-is-light-pollution/effects/safety/).

Light pollution also stops us from seeing the stars; I’m lucky if I can see Orion and Taurus during the right time of year. Many animals also use the stars to find their way (see https://royalsociety.org/blog/2018/01/how-animals-follow-the-stars/), another potential conservation concern for light pollution. It would be interesting to find out how much reduction in outdoor nighttime lighting people would accept, but that’s a rabbit hole for another day!

 

Image credit: Rauno Kalda 

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_pond_bat_(Myotis_dasycneme).jpg

Autism and Spirituality

This is another post taken from my independent study research. Hoping to get back to my typical posting style soon! Meanwhile, Autism and Spirituality © 2025 by Kimberly Israel is licensed under CC BY-NC 4.0

Bertelli et al.: Benefits of spirituality for intellectually disabled and high-support autistic populations

Bertelli et al. (2020) begin their work by noting that, although the importance of spirituality to well-being has become more generally recognized in the past 20 years, research on the topic with respect to intellectually disabled and “low-functioning autistic[1]” (ID/LFA) populations. Their literature review on the topic provides a broad view of what the relatively small number of studies have found. Measures of spirituality vary, but the World Health Organization Quality of Life – Spirituality, Religion, and Personal Beliefs instrument (WHO, 2012) is a representative example. It considers spirituality in terms of connection to a spiritual entity, meaning, joy, inner strength, peace, hope, and faith.

The results of the literature review are unsurprising in light of the conventional wisdom on the importance of spirituality to the “mainstream” population. Spirituality is positively correlated with religious participation extraversion, adaptability, understanding, goal setting, motivation, confidence, cognition, emotional connection, self-control, resilience, immune function, endocrine function, and life expectancy. It is negatively correlated with physical symptoms, heart disease, risk of psychopathology and suicide, anxiety, loneliness, individualism, and “manifestations of unconditional personal freedom” (Bertelli et al., 2020).

The major benefits for ID/LFA populations appear to be life interest and satisfaction; opportunities for growth; frameworks for understanding life, death, and complex emotions; and a lower risk of anxiety, depression, and destructive behaviors such as substance abuse and suicide. Bertelli et al. note, however, that religion has its own risks. Obsessions, delusions, and hallucinations frequently include religious material. For some, religion can intensity neurosis and feelings of fear or guilt; constricting religious beliefs may result in avoidance of life changes and a narrowing of agency in life. Furthermore, ID/LFA individuals may experience rejection by members of religious organizations. In order to best meet the needs of the ID/LFA population, more attention to spiritual well-being is required from service providers and more structural and social accommodations must be established by religious organizations (Bertelli et al., 2020).

Crespi et al.: Autism, schizophrenia, and spirituality

Crespi et al. (2019) report that autistic and schizotypal psychological traits are both inversely correlated with  participation in organized religion but that the reasons may differ between the two psychological categories. In a broad sense, they suggest autistic people simply lack religious belief, while schizophrenic people have beliefs that are too idiosyncratic to fit into an organized religion. They also note that organized religion is a relatively recent development when considered within the timespan of human evolution. Furthermore, they suggest that the implied separation between natural and supernatural is similarly recent, as indigenous societies have typically modeled the entire world as both natural and spiritual.[2] To explain the roots of human religiosity, Crespi et al. cite Lindeman et al. (2015), who found in a study of Finnish adults that supernatural and religious beliefs are best predicted by  “core ontological confusions” between the properties of physical and mental, animate and inanimate, and living and nonliving objects. Importantly, Lindeman et al. also found that mentalizing ability per se did not predict supernatural and religious belief, suggesting that lower mentalizing ability does not explain any difference in religious participation between autistic and neurotypical populations.

---

[1] Autistic functioning labels used by researchers are introduced in quotes because many in the autism community find them objectionable (Vance, 2018).

[2] The fact that many indigenous societies also have traditions that specifically function to interface between the “everyday” world and the “spirit” world suggests that this may be an oversimplification.

Image credit: Kahlil Gibran

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Spirit_of_Light_or_Spiritual_Communion_by_Kahlil_Gibran.jpg

References

Bertelli, M.O., Del Furia, C., Bonadiman, M., Rondini, E., Banks, R., & Lassi, S. (2020). The relationship between spiritual life and quality of life in people with intellectual disability and/or low-functioning autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Religion and Health, 59(4), 1996-2018.

Crespi, B., Dinsdale, N., Read, S., & Hurd, P. (2019). Spirituality, dimensional autism, and schizotypal traits: the search for meaning. PLoS ONE, 14(3), e0213456.

Lindeman, M., Svedholm-Hakkinen, A.M., & Lipsanen, J. (2015). Ontological confusions but not mentalizing abilities predict religious belief, paranormal belief, and belief in supernatural purpose. Cognition, 134, 63-76.

Vance, T. (2018, September 10). Function labels: and we're supposed to be the awkward ones... NeuroClastic. https://neuroclastic.com/the-journey-begins/.

WHO. (2012). WHOQOL-SRPB field-test instrument (WHO/MSD/MER/Rev.2012.04). World Health Organization, Department of Mental Health & Substance Dependence. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-MSD-MER-Rev-2012-04.

Transpersonal Psychology Research Approaches

Another post from my research project. Paper is done, so I'll probably have one more post like this as I get caught up before gettng back into exploring new research. Transpersonal Psychology Research Approaches © 2025 by Kimberly Israel is licensed under CC BY-NC 4.0

 Cunningham and State-Specific Research

Like many in the transpersonal field, Cunningham (2023) calls for state-specific research, stating that “if you want to know the ontological reality of the dream world, then you need to go to sleep and have a lucid dream.” Of course, we already know that people have lucid dreams, so the question is more about whether the dream reality exists independently of the dreamer. It would certainly be fascinating to find evidence, as Cunningham suggests, that our waking inability to perceive dream realities is due to our state-specific attentional options rather than the ontological status of dreams. So far, however, no such evidence has been offered. Cunningham goes on to describe Jung’s “objective” and “subjective” methods for interacting with transpersonal phenomena: the objective method treats the phenomena as literal realities, allowing for questioning and observation, while the subjective method treats them as subconscious symbols, allowing for integration. The usefulness of both perspectives for individual meaning-making is clear, but neither seems to address the question of ontological reality.

Cunningham claims that science assumes the ontological reality of its conventional subject matter but not of transpersonal concepts such as souls, spirits, or dream realms. The implication seems to be that scientists are unfair in doing so, but perhaps the question in science isn’t so much “Is the phenomenon ontologically real?” as “Can I probe the phenomenon with the tools and methods available to me?” The transpersonal experiences of other people rarely meet that criterion.

Mathias and Phenomenology

           

Mathias (2023) suggests that researchers in transpersonal psychology and parapsychology could benefit from collaboration in development of theories about potential nonphysical realities in order to generate methodologies for their empirical study. In particular, he recommends phenomenological studies of reported psi experiences, exploring the personal meaning and situational factors surrounding them. Focusing on phenomenological data while bracketing the question of objective reality may allow for development of theories that could then be used to design replicable experiments. Such research would be interesting in itself from the perspective of transpersonal psychology.

 

He also proposes the use of nonlinguistic methods, perhaps because transpersonal experiences are often nonlinguistic, but it is unclear how such methods would improve the situation. He cites Shewmaker (1962) as an example. Shewmaker (1962) suggests that the categories of language are too abstract and oversimplified to describe psi and that therefore nondiscursive symbolic expressions might be more effective. Any symbolic representation, however, would seem to suffer from the same problems of oversimplification. Nonetheless, nondiscursive symbols in addition to words may be useful, similar to the way line drawings of plants in addition to a botanical key can help with identification.

 

Mathias positions himself in the field in reference to Taylor and Hartelius, suggesting that the two differ as much because of their goals and priorities as because of their epistemologies. He draws an analogy between Taylor and Hartelius on one hand and Ferrer and Friedman on the other, drawing on Hartelius’s separate synthesis of the ideas of Ferrer and Friedman. Mathias cites Hartelius as explaining that Friedman takes “supernatural” to mean “completely inaccessible by any senses”, while Ferrer takes it to refer to phenomena that can only be observed in particular circumstances. Both, however, have similar ideas on how to handle things that are completely inaccessible and how to handle things that can sometimes be observed. Similarly, Mathias goes on to say, Hartelius takes “metaphysical” to mean “not empirically verifiable by definition,” while Taylor take is to refer to a particular Western categorization of concepts. Both would like to see more empirical research, but Hartelius is more interested in making transpersonal psychology practical here and now, while Taylor is more interested in bring about a paradigm shift in science to include metaphysics as he understands it. Mathias aligns himself with Taylor’s priorities while suggesting that the field includes more common ground than one might first suspect.

Image credit: Lorenza Walker

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:REM-s%C3%B8vn.jpg

References

Cunningham, P.F. (2023). An empirically controlled metaphysics in a science of spirituality - is something real happening? Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 43(2), 90-107.

Mathias, J. (2023). Collaborative nonphysical theory in transpersonal psychology and parapsychology. California Institute of Integral Studies.

Shewmaker, K. L., & Berenda, C. W. (1962). Science and the problem of PSI. Philosophy of Science, 29(2), 195–203. [Abstract]

Harris Friedman and the Science of Transpersonal Psychology

I'm deep in my final paper for my independent study, so once again I'm posting part of a writeup for the research I've done along the way. Harris Friedman and the Science of Transpersonal Psychology © 2025 by Kimberly Israel is licensed under CC BY-NC 4.0

Romanticism, Scientism, and Constructivism

Harris Friedman advocates for transpersonal psychology to be circumscribed as a scientific field, suggesting that nonscientific approaches could legitimately belong to “transpersonal studies” but not “transpersonal psychology” (Friedman, 2002). He argues that psychology is generally treated as a science, that transpersonal psychology was originally developed along those scientific lines, and that using the word “psychology” to define the field carries an expectation of scientific methodology, particularly in clinical settings. He describes three major attitudes that diminish the scientific reputation of the field: romanticism, scientism, and constructivism.

 

Friedman (2005) describes romanticism as “rejection of rationality, fascination for the so-called exotic, erosion of all basis for discriminating among truth claims, fixation of idyllic images regarding humanity's relationship with nature, and attributions of supernatural claims without evidentiary support.” Examples include using astrology in a clinical practice or interpreting Eastern religious concepts as corresponding to particular states of consciousness (Friedman, 2002). Indeed, he demonstrates the issue quite succinctly in a non-paper in which he proposes to describe “all cogent scientific conceptualizations of the non-dual” (Friedman, 2018a) and presents the reader with a blank page. The abstract to the “article” explains that characterization of psychological states as non-dual depends on metaphysical constructs, which cannot be scientifically evaluated.

 

Friedman (2002) goes on to say that scientism is more of a concern outside the field than within; it is characterized by a narrow conception of what can and should be studied using scientific methods and frequently carries the assumption that romanticism is all transpersonal psychology has to offer. Transpersonal psychology is practically taboo in conventional psychology departments (Friedman, 2018b), possibly due to scientistic prejudice.

 

Constructivism, meanwhile, is the extreme postmodern view that because all human knowledge-building is influenced by culture and subject to bias and blind spots, no meaningful concept of reality is possible. While recognition of the limits of objectivity is certainly useful, science cannot proceed without some sense that methodology matters, that evidence means something beyond personal preference (Friedman, 2002).

 

Of course, much of the subject matter important to transpersonal psychology is outside the realm of science: transcendence, divinity, and nonduality are metaphysical concepts that cannot be directly probed. Science can, however, explore areas such as the effect of subjectively transcendent experiences on people’s lives or the influence of culture on one’s concept of transcendence. We can study the “phenomena,” the material available to our senses, including reports of others’ experience, without claiming access to the “noumena,” the things in themselves, such as the ontological validity of subjective experience (Friedman, 2002). Although Friedman takes a strong stance in favor of transpersonal psychology as a science, he also accepts that nonscientific sources, such as spiritual teachers or traditions, may well be valuable sources of knowledge in one’s personal life. Although Friedman is a psychologist rather than a paleontologist, his stance seems to approximate Gould’s (1997) position of “nonoverlapping magisteria.”

Western Romanticism Towards Aikido

As a practitioner of aikido, Friedman (2005) uses it as a case study of the kind of romanticism he finds objectionable in the transpersonal field. He begins by noting that the roots of the martial art are in the training needed for a disarmed samurai to have a chance of surviving against his opponents long enough to escape. The character traits of courage and present-moment focus emphasized by the practice would also have been specifically adaptive in combat conditions.

 

Friedman notes that in cross-cultural situations, Westerners interested in transpersonal systems frequently romanticize traditional lines of authority and teaching styles, assuming without evidence that because the tradition demonstrates some benefits, it is correct in all things. As an example, he refers to the primary global school of aikido, leadership of which has been handed down from father to son. The current head of the school is the grandson of the man who developed much of modern aikido but is young and inexperienced. Friedman sees unquestioning acceptance of the current leader’s qualifications as a form of romanticism.

 

He also challenges the tendency to romanticize Japan as the spiritual home or truest expression of aikido simply because the practice developed there: today, aikido has many more practitioners outside Japan, where baseball is far more popular. Finally, he explains that the effectiveness of aikido can be understood without reference to the supernatural. The martial art does take a transpersonal perspective of viewing self and opponent as one system, and Friedman argues that doing so results in greater attunement to the opponent and a more effective defense. Impressive feats like the “unbendable arm” don’t rely on a conceptually nebulous “energy” but on physiological relaxation of opposing muscles and the prevention of inhibitory nerve impulses through clarity of intent (Friedman, 2005).

Image credit: Christelle Fillonneau

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikyo_omote.jpeg

(This is not an image of Friedman, just a representative image of people practicing aikido)

                                                                        References

Friedman, H. (2002). Transpersonal psychology as a scientific field. International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 21(1), 175-187.

Friedman, H. (2005). Problems of romanticism in transpersonal psychology: a case study of aikido. The Humanistic Psychologist, 33(1), 3-24.

Friedman, H.L. (2018a). An explication of all cogent scientific conceptualizations regarding the non-dual: finding nothing to write. International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 37(2), 116-118.

Friedman, H.L. (2018b). Transpersonal psychology as a heterodox approach to psychological science: focus on the construct of self-expansiveness and its measure. Archives of Scientific Psychology 6, 230-242.

Gould, S.J. (1997). Nonoverlapping magisteria. Natural History, 106, 16-22.

Buriro, Z. A., Nawaz, H. I., & Asif, M. (2025). FROM EMPHASIS TO MOCKERY: THE MULTIFUNCTIONAL ROLE OF REDUPLICATION IN SINDHI. Journal of Applied Linguistics and TESOL (JALT), 8(2), 959-969.

 What They Did

The researchers studied the linguistic role of word and sound reduplication in Sindhi, a major language of Pakistan, particularly the province of Sindh. They collected 31 instances of reduplication from social settings and analyzed their contextual meaning with the assistance of native speakers. Reduplication of full words often carries emotional content. Saying گهم گهم (‘ghum ghum’) is a reference to wandering around and can be used affectionately in the sense of a parent telling a child to go have fun. The phrase کل کل (‘khil khil’) can refer to someone laughing happily, but in response to mocking, the meaning is more akin to “You’re laughing now, but my time will come.”

Sound reduplications may be rhymes, near rhymes, or alliterations. They frequently carry information about the situational context. Saying وٺ سٺ (‘wath sath’) refers to being in a hurry, particularly for handling complex plans such as wedding preparations. The phrase پويتياگتي (‘agte poete’) literally means “back and forth” and socially refers to a situation in which another person won’t make a commitment. When people say سهانگو مهانگ (‘mahango sahango’), which translates as “costly but necessary,” it’s generally a comment on rising costs of necessary items and the fact that they have to be purchased anyway.

Sinhi speakers also use reduplication of words that have no literal meaning. The phrase هور هور (‘horr horr’) is used to mock someone in an exaggerated way, while تر تر (‘tur tur’) is an angry warning that the opponent in a confrontation had better leave.

 

Further Exploration

I use reduplication in my own communication. My spouse and I often want to text “k” as a shorthand for “Ok” but somehow “k” on its own feels abrupt or dismissive, so we’ve taken to using “kk.” This defeats the purpose of shortening “Ok,” but it’s also developed a different feeling: “kk” carries a sense of being on the same wavelength, of being in an activity together, even if we’re carrying out different tasks. “Ok,” on the other hand, has a sense of accepting information or instruction from the other person.

Similarly, if I text “neat neat” in response to a story or observation, that means I’m engaged and open to hearing more, whereas “neat” without the repetition has more of a sense of “I’m happy for you and want to be supportive but am not necessarily interested for myself.” Of course, these examples are highly idiosyncratic, but many other examples of reduplication in English will likely be familiar (see https://daily.jstor.org/the-nitty-gritty-on-reduplication-so-good-you-have-to-say-it-twice/).

In the sentence “I’ll make the tuna salad and you make the salad-salad,” the repetition indicates that the second salad is closer to the central concept of a salad. Sound reduplications in English are often informal and nonliteral. The phrase “loosey-goosey,” for example, seems to have a sense of being unstructured almost to the point of falling apart, which may indicate negligence or flexibility, depending on the situation, but has nothing to do with geese. Lots of other languages also use reduplication, but that’s a rabbit hole for another day!

Image credit: Baba66

https://simple.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Sindh.svg

Hunter, Holly, Grace Blackburn, Benjamin J. Ashton, and Amanda R. Ridley. "Group size affects spontaneous quantity discrimination performance in wild Western Australian magpies (Gymnorhina tibicen dorsalis)." Animal Cognition 28, no. 1 (2025):

What They Did

The researchers studied the ability of wild Western Australian magpies to distinguish quantities. The magpies live in groups of 3 to 15 in urban semi-natural areas and are accustomed to humans. Individual magpies were separated from their group, either by waiting for them to wander off naturally or by distracting the other group members. The bird under study was then presented with a randomized sequence of choices between two boards: one with two strips of cheese and the other with two, three, four, or five strips. Over the course of the experiment, 42 birds were tested, each being offered the four choices 15 times on separate days.

 The researchers found that the birds chose the larger amount of food more than half the time, with better performance correlated with greater differences between the amounts. They also found that birds that lived in smaller groups were more likely to choose five strips of cheese over two, but the group size had no effect for the other combinations. The correlation between “correct” choice likelihood and difference between the choices suggests that the birds decide based on ratio rather than absolute number, with the smallest ratio (i.e. 2:5) easiest to detect.

The researchers also propose two hypotheses for the effect of group size. Smaller groups may offer less protection in intergroup conflicts, making it important to compare the size of rival group. Smaller groups also have fewer individuals watching for predators, so it’s more important to maximize the benefit of limited foraging time.

 

Further Exploration

The researchers describe two cognitive systems animals use to process quantity information: the object-file system tracks each object and works for small numbers, while the approximate number system provides a general idea of which group is larger. This seems to be the case for humans too. Automatically knowing how many objects are in a group in called subitizing (see https://hechingerreport.org/proof-points-subitizing/). Perceptual subitizing means seeing the number of objects “all at once.” For humans, the maximum is typically 4 to 6 objects.

Larger numbers, however, can be subitized by mentally dividing the array into groups and subitizing the number in each group, such as seeing three groups of four and knowing there are 12 objects without thinking about counting or multiplication. This process is called conceptual subitizing. Subitizing sounds as if it might be analogous to the object-file system described in animal cognition, and of course humans also seem to have an approximate number system. We can tell which group of items contains more, and we’re better at it if there’s a greater difference between them.

Humans can also count one by one, as long as we have the patience for. A lot of animals deal with quantity in a lot of different ways (see https://www.quantamagazine.org/animals-can-count-and-use-zero-how-far-does-their-number-sense-go-20210809/), but I haven’t seen any evidence that they can count symbolically and indefinitely the way humans do. It would also be interesting to see how animals handle number when the objects are dissimilar or when distractor objects are included, but that’s a rabbit hole for another day!    

Image credit: D. Gordon E. Robertson

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Western_Magpie,_Perth.jpg